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Abstract
In hardware virtualization a hypervisor provides multiple Virtual Ma-
chines (VMs) on a single physical system, each executing a separate oper-
ating system instance. The hypervisor schedules execution of these VMs
much as the scheduler in an operating system does, balancing factors such
as fairness and I/O performance. As in an operating system, the scheduler
may be vulnerable to malicious behavior on the part of users seeking to
deny service to others or maximize their own resource usage.
Recently, publically available cloud computing services such as Amazon
EC2 have used virtualization to provide customers with virtual machines
running on the provider’s hardware, typically charging by wall clock time
rather than resources consumed. Under this business model, manipula-
tion of the scheduler may allow theft of service at the expense of other
customers, rather than merely re-allocating resources within the same ad-
ministrative domain.
We describe a flaw in the Xen scheduler allowing virtual machines to
consume almost all CPU time, in preference to other users, and demon-
strate kernel-based and user-space versions of the attack. We show results
demonstrating the vulnerability in the lab, consuming as much as 98% of
CPU time regardless of fair share, as well as on Amazon EC2, where
Xen modifications protect other users but still allow theft of service. In
case of EC2, following the responsible disclosure model, we have reported
this vulnerability to Amazon; they have since implemented a fix that we
have tested and verified (See Appendix B). We provide a novel analysis
of the necessary conditions for such attacks, and describe scheduler mod-
ifications to eliminate the vulnerability. We present experimental results
demonstrating the effectiveness of these defenses while imposing negligible
overhead.
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1 Introduction
Server virtualization [4] enables multiple instances of an operating system and
applications (virtual machines or VMs) to run on the same physical hardware,
as if each were on its own machine. Recently server virtualization has been used
to provide so-called cloud computing services, in which customers rent virtual
machines running on hardware owned and managed by third-party providers.
Two such cloud computing services are Amazon’s Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2)
service and Microsoft Windows Azure Platform; in addition, similar services are
offered by a number of web hosting providers (e.g. Rackspace’s Rackspace Cloud
and ServePath Dedicated Hosting’s GoGrid) and referred to as Virtual Private
Servers (VPS). In each of these services customers are charged by the amount
of time their virtual machine is running (in hours or months), rather than by
the amount of CPU time used.
The operation of a hypervisor is in many ways similar to that of an operating
system; just as an operating system manages access by processes to underlying
resources, so too a hypervisor must manage access by multiple virtual machines
to a single physical machine. In either case the choice of scheduling algorithm
will involve a trade-off between factors such as fairness, usage caps and schedul-
ing latency.
As in operating systems, a hypervisor scheduler may be vulnerable to be-
havior by virtual machines which results in inaccurate or unfair scheduling.
Such anomalies and their potential for malicious use have been recognized in
the past in operating systems—McCanne and Torek [16] demonstrate a denial-
of-service attack on 4.4BSD, and more recently Tsafrir [25] presents a similar
attack against Linux 2.6 which was fixed only recently. Such attacks typically
rely on the use of periodic sampling or a low-precision clock to measure CPU
usage; like a train passenger hiding whenever the conductor checks tickets, an
attacking process ensures it is never scheduled when a scheduling tick occurs.
Cloud computing represents a new environment for such attacks, however,
for two reasons. First, the economic model of many services renders them vul-
nerable to theft-of-service attacks, which can be successful with far lower degrees
of unfairness than required for strong denial-of-service attacks. In addition, the
lack of detailed application knowledge in the hypervisor (e.g. to differentiate
I/O wait from voluntary sleep) makes it more difficult to harden a hypervisor
scheduler against malicious behavior.
The scheduler used by the Xen hypervisor (and with modifications by Ama-
zon EC2) is vulnerable to such timing-based manipulation—rather than receiv-
ing its fair share of CPU resources, a VM running on unmodified Xen using
our attack can obtain up to 98% of total CPU cycles, regardless of the number
of other VMs running on the same core. In addition we demonstrate a kernel
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module allowing unmodified applications to readily obtain 80% of the CPU. The
Xen scheduler also supports a non-work-conserving (NWC) mode where each
VM’s CPU usage is “capped”; in this mode our attack is able to evade its limits
and use up to 85% of total CPU cycles. The modified EC2 scheduler uses this
to differentiate levels of service; it protects other VMs from our attack, but we
still evade utilization limits (typically 40%) and consume up to 85% of CPU
cycles.
We give a novel analysis of the conditions which must be present for such
attacks to succeed, and present four scheduling modifications which will prevent
this attack without sacrificing efficiency, fairness, or I/O responsiveness. We
have implemented these algorithms, and present experimental results evaluating
them on Xen 3.2.1.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 provides a brief in-
troduction to VMM architectures, Xen VMM and Amazon EC2 as background.
Section 3 describes the details of the Xen Credit scheduler. Section 4 explains
our attacking scheme and presents experimental results in the lab as well as on
Amazon EC2. Next, Section 5 details our scheduling modifications to prevent
this attack, and evaluates their performance and overhead. Section 6 discusses
related work, and we conclude in Section 7.
2 Background
We first provide a brief overview of hardware virtualization technology in gen-
eral, and of the Xen hypervisor and Amazon’s Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2)
service in particular.
2.1 Hardware Virtualization
Hardware virtualization refers to any system which interposes itself between an
operating system and the hardware on which it executes, providing an emulated
or virtualized view of physical resources. Almost all virtualization systems allow
multiple operating system instances to execute simultaneously, each in its own
virtual machine (VM). In these systems a Virtual Machine Monitor (VMM),
also known as a hypervisor, is responsible for resource allocation and mediation
of hardware access by the various VMs.
Modern hypervisors may be classified by the methods of executing guest
OS code without hardware access: (a) binary emulation and translation, (b)
paravirtualization, and (c) hardware virtualization support. Binary emulation
executes privileged guest code in software, typically with just-in-time translation
for speed [1]. Hardware virtualization support [3] in recent x86 CPUs supports a
privilege level beyond supervisor mode, used by the hypervisor to control guest
OS execution. Finally, paravirtualization allows the guest OS to execute directly
in user mode, but provides a set of hypercalls, like system calls in a conventional
operating system, which the guest uses to perform privileged functions.
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2.2 The Xen Hypervisor
Xen is an open source VMM for the x86/x64 platform [9]. It introduced par-
avirtualization on the x86, using it to support virtualization of modified guest
operating systems without hardware support (unavailable at the time) or the
overhead of binary translation. Above the hypervisor there are one or more
virtual machines or domains which use hypervisor services to manipulate the
virtual CPU and perform I/O.
Instance Type Memory Cores × speed $/Hr
Small 1.7GB 1 × 1 0.085
Large 7.5 2 × 2 0.34
X-Large 15 4 × 2 0.68
Hi-CPU Med. 1.7 2 × 2.5 0.17
Hi-CPU X-Large 7 8 × 2.5 0.68
Table 1: Amazon EC2 Instance Types and Pricing. (Fall 2010. Speed is given
in “Amazon EC2 Compute Units”.)
2.3 Amazon Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2)
Amazon EC2 is a commercial service which allows customers to run their own
virtual machine instances on Amazon’s servers, for a specified price per hour
each VM is running. Details of the different instance types currently offered, as
well as pricing per instance-hour, are shown in Table 1.
Amazon states that EC2 is powered by “a highly customized version of
Xen, taking advantage of virtualization” [2]. The operating systems supported
are Linux, OpenSolaris, and Windows Server 2003; Linux instances (and likely
OpenSolaris) use Xen’s paravirtualized mode, and it is suspected that Windows
instances do so as well [5].
3 Xen Scheduling
In Xen (and other hypervisors) a single virtual machine consists of one or more
virtual CPUs (VCPUs); the goal of the scheduler is to determine which VCPU
to execute on each physical CPU (PCPU) at any instant. To do this it must
determine which VCPUs are idle and which are active, and then from the active
VCPUs choose one for each PCPU.
In a virtual machine, a VCPU is idle when there are no active processes
running on it and the scheduler on that VCPU is running its idle task. On early
systems the idle task would loop forever; on more modern ones it executes a
HALT instruction, stopping the CPU in a lower-power state until an interrupt is
received. On a fully-virtualized system this HALT traps to the hypervisor and
indicates the VCPU is now idle; in a paravirtualized system a direct hypervisor
call is used instead. When an exception (e.g. timer or I/O interrupt) arrives,
that VCPU becomes active until HALT is invoked again.
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By default Xen uses the Credit scheduler [6], an implementation of the classic
token bucket algorithm in which credits arrive at a constant rate, are conserved
up to a maximum, and are expended during service. Each VCPU receives
credits at an administratively determined rate, and a periodic scheduler tick
debits credits from the currently running VCPU. If it has no more credits, the
next VCPU with available credits is scheduled. Every 3 ticks the scheduler
switches to the next runnable VCPU in round-robin fashion, and distributes
new credits, capping the credit balance of each VCPU at 300 credits. Detailed
parameters (assuming even weights) are:
Fast tick period: 10ms
Slower (rescheduling) tick: 30ms
Credits debited per fast tick: 100
Credit arrivals per fast tick: 100/N
Maximum credits: 300
where N is the number of VCPUs per PCPU. The fast tick decrements the
running VCPU by 100 credits every 10ms, giving each credit a value of 100µs
of CPU time; the cap of 300 credits corresponds to 30ms, or a full schedul-
ing quantum. Based on their credit balance, VCPUs are divided into three
states: UNDER, with a positive credit balance, OVER, or out of credits, and
BLOCKED or halted.
The VCPUs on a PCPU are kept in an ordered list, with those in UNDER
state ahead of those in OVER state; the VCPU at the head of the queue is
selected for execution. In work conserving mode, when no VCPUs are in the
UNDER state, one in the OVER state will be chosen, allowing it to receive more
than its share of CPU. In non-work-conserving (NWC) mode, the PCPU will
go idle instead.
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Figure 1: Per-PCPU Run Queue Structure
The executing VCPU leaves the run queue head in one of two ways: by going
idle, or when removed by the scheduler while it is still active. VCPUs which go
idle enter the BLOCKED state and are removed from the queue. Active VCPUs
are enqueued after all other VCPUs of the same state—OVER or UNDER—as
shown in Figure 1. The basic credit scheduler accurately distributes resources
between CPU-intensive workloads, ensuring that a VCPU receiving k credits
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per 30ms epoch will receive at least k/10ms of CPU time within a period of
30Nms. This fairness comes at the expense of I/O performance, however, as
events such as packet reception may wait as long as 30Nms for their VCPU to
be scheduled.
To achieve better I/O latency, the Xen Credit scheduler attempts to pri-
oritize such I/O. When a VCPU sleeps waiting for I/O it will typically have
remaining credits; when it wakes with remaining credits it enters the BOOST
state and may immediately preempt running or waiting VCPUs with lower pri-
orities. If it goes idle again with remaining credits, it will wake again in BOOST
priority at the next I/O event.
This allows I/O-intensive workloads to achieve very low latency, consuming
little CPU and rarely running out of credits, while preserving fair CPU distri-
bution among CPU-bound workloads, which typically utilize all their credits
before being preempted. However, as we describe in the following section, it
also allows a VM to “steal” more than its fair share of CPU time.
4 Credit Scheduler Attacks
Although the Credit scheduler provides fairness and low I/O latency for well-
behaved virtual machines, poorly-behaved ones can evade its fairness guaran-
tees. In this section we describe the features of the scheduler which render it
vulnerable to attack, formulate an attack scheme, and present results showing
successful theft of service both in the lab and in the field on EC2 instances
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Figure 2: Attack Timing
4.1 Attack Description
Our attack relies on periodic sampling as used by the Xen scheduler, and is
shown as a timeline in Figure 2. Every 10ms the scheduler tick fires and sched-
ules the attacking VM, which runs for 10− εms and then calls Halt() to briefly
go idle, ensuring that another VM will be running at the next scheduler tick. In
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theory the efficiency of this attack increases as ε approaches 0; however in prac-
tice some amount of timing jitter is found, and overly small values of ε increase
the risk of the VM being found executing when the scheduling tick arrives.
When perfectly executed on the non-BOOST credit scheduler, this ensures
that the attacking VM will never have its credit balance debited. If there are N
VMs with equal shares, then the N-1 victim VMs will receive credits at a total
rate of N−1
N
, and will be debited at a total rate of 1.
This vulnerability is due not only to the predictability of the sampling, but
to the granularity of the measurement. If the time at which each VM began and
finished service were recorded with a clock with the same 10ms resolution, the
attack would still succeed, as the attacker would have a calculated execution
time of 0 on transition to the next VM.
This attack is more effective against the actual Xen scheduler because of its
BOOST priority mechanism. When the attacking VM yields the CPU, it goes
idle and waits for the next timer interrupt. Due to a lack of information at the
VM boundary, however, the hypervisor is unable to distinguish between a VM
waking after a deliberate sleep period—a non-latency-sensitive event—and one
waking for e.g. packet reception. The attacker thus wakes in BOOST priority
and is able to preempt the currently running VM, so that it can execute for
10− εms out of every 10ms scheduler cycle.
4.2 User-level Implementation
To examine the performance of our attack scenario in practice, we implement
it using both user-level and kernel-based code and evaluate them in the lab and
on Amazon EC2. In each case we test with two applications: a simple loop
we refer to as “Cycle Counter” described below, and the Dhrystone 2.1 [26]
CPU benchmark. Our attack described in Section 4.1 requires millisecond-level
timing in order to sleep before the debit tick and then wake again at the tick; it
performs best either with a tick-less Linux kernel [24] or with the kernel timer
frequency set to 1000Hz.
Experiments in the lab
Our first experiments evaluate our attack against unmodified Xen in the lab
in work-conserving mode, verifying the ability of the attack to both deny CPU
resources to competing “victim” VMs, and to effectively use the “stolen” CPU
time for computation. All experiments were performed on Xen 3.2.1, on a 2-core
2.7GHz Intel Core2 CPU. Virtual machines were 32-bit, paravirtualized, single-
VCPU instances with 192MB memory, each running Suse 11.0 Core kernel
2.6.25 with a 1000Hz kernel timer frequency.
To test our ability to steal CPU resources from other VMs, we implement
a “Cycle Counter”, which performs no useful work, but rather spins using the
RDTSC instruction to read the timestamp register and track the time during
which the VM is scheduled. The attack is performed by a variant of this code,
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“Cycle Stealer”, which tracks execution time and sleeps once it has been sched-
uled for 10− ε (here ε = 1ms).
prev=rdtsc()
loop:
if (rdtsc() - prev) > 9ms
prev = rdtsc()
usleep(0.5ms)
Note that the sleep time is slightly less than ε, as the process will be woken
at the next OS tick after timer expiration and we wish to avoid over-sleeping.
In Figure 3(a) we see attacker and victim performance on our 2-core test sys-
tem. As the number of victims increases, attacker performance remains almost
constant at roughly 90% of a single core, while the victims share the remaining
core.
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Figure 3: Lab experiments (User Level) - CPU and application performance for
attacker and victims.
To measure the ability of our attack to effectively use stolen CPU cycles,
we embed the attack within the Dhrystone benchmark. By comparing the time
required for the attacker and an unmodified VM to complete the same number
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of Dhrystone iterations, we can determine the net amount of work stolen by the
attacker.
Our baseline measurement was made with one VM running unmodified
Dhrystone, with no competing usage of the system; it completed 1.5 × 109
iterations in 208.8 seconds. When running 6 unmodified instances, three for
each core, each completed the same 1.5 × 109 iterations in 640.8 seconds on
average—32.6% the baseline speed, or close to the expected fair share per-
formance of 33.3%. With one modified attacker instance competing against 5
unmodified victims, the attacker completed in 245.3 seconds, running at a speed
of 85.3% of baseline, rather than 33.3%, with a corresponding decrease in victim
performance. Full results for experiments with 0 to 5 unmodified victims and
the modified Dhrystone attacker are shown in Figure 3(b).
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Figure 4: Lab: User-level attack performance vs. execute times. (note - sleep
time ≤ 10−spin time)
In the modified Dhrystone attacker the TSC register is sampled once for
each iteration of a particular loop, as described in the appendix; if this sam-
pling occurs too slowly the resulting timing inaccuracy might affect results. To
determine whether this might occur, lengths of the compute and sleep phases
of the attack were measured. Almost all (98.8%) of the compute intervals were
found to lie within the bounds 9±0.037ms, indicating that the Dhrystone attack
was able to attain timing precision comparable to that of Cycle Stealer.
Cycle Stealer Dhrystones % of
(% of 1 core achieved) per second baseline
attacker 81.0 5749039 80.0
victims 23.4 1658553 23.1
Table 2: Lab: User-level attack performance in non-work-conserving mode with
33.3% limit.
As described in Section 4.1, the attacker runs for a period of length 10−εms
and then briefly goes to sleep to avoid the sampling tick. A smaller value of ε
increases the CPU time stolen by the attacker; however, too small an ε increases
the chance of being charged due to timing jitter. To examine this trade-off
we tested values of 10 − ε between 7 and 9.9ms. Figure 4 shows that under
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lab conditions the peak value was 98% with an execution time of 9.8ms and
a requested sleep time of 0.1ms. When execution time exceeded 9.8ms the
attacker was seen by sampling interrupts with high probability. In this case it
received only about 21% of one core, or even less than the fair share of 33.3%.
Additional experiments were performed to examine attack performance against
the Xen scheduler in non-work-conserving mode. One attacker and 5 victims
were run on our 2-core test system, with a CPU cap of 33% set for each VM;
results are presented in Table 2 for both Cycle Stealer and Dhrystone attackers,
including user-level and kernel-level implementation. Here the attacker achieves
about 80% of baseline performance with user-level implementation, or slightly
less than attacking performance in work-conserving mode. We speculate that in
both cases the attacker has a similar chance of being charged by the sampling
tick, but that the penalty for being charged is higher in the NWC case.
Experiments on Amazon
We evaluate our attacking using Amazon EC2 Small instances with the following
attributes: 32-bit, 1.7GB memory, 1 VCPU, running Amazon’s Fedora Core 8
kernel 2.6.18, with a 1000Hz kernel timer. We note that the VCPU provided
to the Small instance is described as having “1 EC2 Compute Unit”, while
the VCPUs for larger and more expensive instances are described as having 2
or 2.5 compute units; this indicates that the scheduler is being used in non-
work-conserving mode to throttle Small instances. To verify this hypothesis,
we ran Cycle Stealer in measurement (i.e. non-attacking) mode on multiple
Small instances, verifying that these instances are capped to less than 1
2
of a
single CPU core—in particular, approximately 38% on the measured systems.
We believe that the nominal CPU cap for 1-unit instances on the measured
hardware is 40%, corresponding to an unthrottled capacity of 2.5 units.
Additional experiments were performed on a set of 8 Small instances co-
located on a single 4-core 2.6GHz physical system provided by our partners
at Amazon.1 The Cycle Stealer and Dhrystone attacks measured in the lab
were performed in this configuration, and results are shown in Figure 5(a) and
Figure 5(b), respectively. We find that our attack is able to evade the CPU
cap of 40% imposed by EC2 on Small instances, obtaining up to 85% of one
core in the absence of competing VMs. When co-located CPU-hungry “victim”
VMs were present, however, EC2 performance diverged from that of unmodified
Xen. As seen in Figures 5(a) and 5(b), co-located VM performance was virtually
unaffected by our attack. Although this attack was able to steal cycles from
EC2, it was unable to steal cycles from other EC2 customers.
4.3 Kernel Implementation
Implementing a theft-of-service attack at user level is problematic—it involves
modifying and adding overhead to the application consuming the stolen re-
1 This configuration allowed direct measurement of attack impact on co-located “victim”
VMs, as well as eliminating the possibility of degrading performance of other EC2 customers.
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Figure 5: Amazon EC2 experiments - CPU and application performance for
attacker and victims.
sources, and may not work on applications which lack a regular structure. In
contrast, a kernel-module version of this attack allows stolen cycles to be used
by arbitrary, unmodified programs.
The attack is implemented as a kernel thread which invokes an OS sleep for
10− εms, allowing user applications to run, and then invokes the SCHED block
hypercall via the safe halt function. In practice ε must be higher than for the
user-mode attack, due to timing granularity and jitter in the kernel.
loop:
msleep(8);
safe_halt();
4.3.1 Experimental Results
Lab experiments were performed with one attacking VM, which loads the kernel
module, and up to 5 victims running a simple CPU-bound loop. In this case the
fair CPU share for each guest instance on our 2-core test system would be 200
N
%
of a single core, where N is the total number of VMs. Due to the granularity of
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Figure 6: Lab experiments (Kernel Level) - CPU and application performance
for attacker and victims.
kernel timekeeping, requiring a larger ε, the efficiency of the kernel-mode attack
is slightly lower than that of the user-mode attack. In our tests, however,
the attacker consumed up to 80.0% of a single core, with the remaining CPU
time shared among the victim instances; results are shown in Figure 6. The
average amount of CPU stolen by the attacker decreases slightly (from 80.0% to
78.2%) as the number of victims increases; we speculate that this may be due
to increased timing jitter causing the attacker to occasionally be charged by the
sampling tick.
In non-work-conserving mode, with a per-VM CPU cap of 33%, the attacker
was able to obtain 80% of a single core, as well. In each case the primary limi-
tation on attack efficiency is the granularity of kernel timekeeping; we speculate
that by more directly manipulating the hypervisor timer it would be possible to
increase efficiency. In addition we note that it often appeared to take seconds
or longer for the attacker to synchronize with the hypervisor tick and evade
resource caps, while the user-level attack succeeds immediately.
The current implementation of the kernel module does not succeed in stealing
cycles on Amazon EC2. Analysis of timing traces indicates a lack of synchro-
nization of the attacker to the hypervisor tick, as seen for NWC mode in the lab,
12
T2T1T0
run sleep
Sampling tick
(probability P)
Tcycle
Figure 7: Attacking trade-offs. The benefit of avoiding sampling with probabil-
ity P must outweigh the cost of forgoing Tsleep CPU cycles.
above; in this case, however, synchronization was never achieved. The user-level
attack displays strong self-synchronizing behavior, aligning almost immediately
to the hypervisor tick; we are investigating approaches to similarly strengthen
self-synchronizing in the kernel module.
5 Theft-resistant Schedulers
The class of theft-of-service attacks on schedulers which we describe is based on
a process or virtual machine voluntarily sleeping when it could have otherwise
remained scheduled. As seen in Figure 7, this involves a tradeoff—the attack
will only succeed if the expected benefit of sleeping for Tsleep is greater than
the guaranteed cost of yielding the CPU for that time period. If the scheduler
is attempting to provide each user with its fair share based on measured usage,
then sleeping for a duration t must reduce measured usage by more than t in
order to be effective. Conversely, a scheduler which ensures that yielding the
CPU will never reduce measured usage more than the sleep period itself will be
resistant to such attacks.
This is a broader condition than that of maintaining an unbiased estimate of
CPU usage, which is examined by McCanne and Torek [16]. Some theft-resistant
schedulers, for instance, may over-estimate the CPU usage of attackers and give
them less than their fair share. In addition, for schedulers which do not meet
our criteria, if we can bound the ratio of sleep time to measurement error, then
we can establish bounds on the effectiveness of a timing-based theft-of-service
attack.
5.1 Exact Scheduler
The most direct solution is the Exact scheduler : using a high-precision clock (in
particular, the TSC) to measure actual CPU usage when a scheduler tick occurs
or when a VCPU yields the CPU and goes idle, thus ensuring that an attacking
VM is always charged for exactly the CPU time it has consumed. In particular,
this involves adding logic to the Xen scheduler to record a high-precision times-
tamp when a VM begins executing, and then calculate the duration of execution
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when it yields the CPU. This is similar to the approach taken in e.g. the recent
tickless Linux kernel [24], where timing is handled by a variable interval timer
set to fire when the next event is due rather than using a fixed-period timer
tick.2
5.2 Randomized Schedulers
An alternative to precise measurement is to sample as before, but on a random
schedule. If this schedule is uncorrelated with the timing of an attacker, then
over sufficiently long time periods we will be able to estimate the attacker’s CPU
usage accurately, and thus prevent attack. Assuming a fixed charge per sample,
and an attack pattern with period Tcycle, the probability P of the sampling
timer falling during the sleep period must be no greater than the fraction of the
cycle
Tsleep
Tcycle
which it represents.
Poisson Scheduler: This leads to a Poisson arrival process for sampling,
where the expected number of samples during an interval is exactly proportional
to its duration, regardless of prior history. This leads to an exponential arrival
time distribution,
∆T =
−lnU
λ
where U is uniform on (0,1) and λ is the rate parameter of the distribution. We
approximate such Poisson arrivals by choosing the inter-arrival time according
to a truncated exponential distribution, with a maximum of 30ms and a mean
of 10ms, allowing us to retain the existing credit scheduler structure. Due to the
possibility of multiple sampling points within a 10ms period we use a separate
interrupt for sampling, rather than re-using or modifying the existing Xen 10ms
interrupt.
Bernoulli Scheduler: The discrete-time analog of the Poisson process, the
Bernoulli process, may be used as an approximation of Poisson sampling. Here
we divide time into discrete intervals, sampling at any interval with probability
p and skipping it with probability q = 1-p. We have implemented a Bernoulli
scheduler with a time interval of 1ms, sampling with p = 1
10
, or one sample
per 10ms, for consistency with the unmodified Xen Credit scheduler. Rather
than generate a timer interrupt with its associated overhead every 1ms, we use
the same implementation strategy as for the Poisson scheduler, generating an
inter-arrival time variate and then setting an interrupt to fire after that interval
expires.
By quantizing time at a 1ms granularity, our Bernoulli scheduler leaves a
small vulnerability, as an attacker may avoid being charged during any 1ms
interval by sleeping before the end of the interval. Assuming that (as in Xen)
it will not resume until the beginning of the next 10ms period, this limits
an attacker to gaining no more than 1ms every 10ms above its fair share, a
relatively insignificant theft of service.
2Although Kim et al. [14] use TSC-based timing measurements in their modifications to
the Xen scheduler, they do not address theft-of-service vulnerabilities.
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Uniform Scheduler: The final randomized scheduler we propose is the
Uniform scheduler, which distributes its sampling uniformly across 10ms schedul-
ing intervals. Rather than generating additional interrupts, or modifying the
time at which the existing scheduler interrupt fires, we perform sampling within
the virtual machine switch code as we did for the exact scheduler. In particular,
at the beginning of each 10ms interval (time t0) we generate a random offset ∆
uniformly distributed between 0 and 10ms. At each VCPU switch, as well as at
the 10ms tick, we check to see whether the current time has exceeded t0 + ∆.
If so, then we debit the currently running VCPU, as it was executing when the
“virtual interrupt” fired at t0 +∆.
Although in this case the sampling distribution is not memoryless, it is still
sufficient to thwart our attacker. We assume that sampling is undetectable by
the attacker, as it causes only a brief interruption indistinguishable from other
asynchronous events such as network interrupts. In this case, as with Poisson
arrivals the expected number of samples within any interval in a 10ms period
is exactly proportional to the duration of the interval.
Our implementation of the uniform scheduler quantizes ∆ with 1ms gran-
ularity, leaving a small vulnerability as described in the case of the Bernoulli
scheduler. As in that case, however, the vulnerability is small enough that
it may be ignored. We note also that this scheduler is not theft-proof if the
attacker is able to observe the sampling process. If we reach the 5ms point
without being sampled, for instance, the probability of being charged 10ms in
the remaining 5ms is 1, while avoiding that charge would only cost 5ms.
5.3 Evaluation
We have implemented each of the four modified schedulers on Xen 3.2.1. Since
the basic credit and priority boosting mechanisms have not been modified from
the original scheduler, our modified schedulers should retain the same fairness
and I/O performance properties of the original in the face of well-behaved appli-
cations. To verify performance in the face of ill-behaved applications we tested
attack performance against the new schedulers; in addition measuring overhead
and I/O performance.
CPU(%) obtained by the attacker
Scheduler (user-level) (kernel-level)
Xen Credit 85.6 78.8
Exact 32.9 33.1
Uniform 33.1 33.3
Poisson 33.0 33.2
Bernoulli 33.1 33.2
Table 3: Performance of the schedulers against cycle stealer
15
Dhrystones/sec (M) % of baseline
Scheduler (user) (kernel) (user) (kernel)
Xen Credit 6.13 5.59 85.3 77.8
Exact 2.32 2.37 32.2 33.0
Uniform 2.37 2.40 33.0 33.4
Poisson 2.32 2.38 32.4 33.1
Bernoulli 2.33 2.39 32.5 33.3
Table 4: Performance of the schedulers against Dhrystone
5.3.1 Performance against attack
In Table 3 we see the performance of our Cycle Stealer on the Xen Credit
scheduler and the modified schedulers. All four of the schedulers were successful
in thwarting the attack: when co-located with 5 victim VMs on 2 cores on the
unmodified scheduler, the attacker was able to consume 85.6% of a single-CPU
with user-level attacking and 80% with kernel-level attacking , but no more than
its fair share on each of the modified ones. (Note that the 85.6% consumption
with user-level attacking in the unmodified case was limited by the choice of
ε = 1ms, and can increase with suitably reduced values of ε as shown in Figure
4.)
In Table 4 we see similar results for the modified Dhrystone attacker. Com-
pared to the baseline, the unmodified scheduler allows the attacker to steal about
85.3% CPU cycles with user-level attacking and 77.8% with kernel-level attack-
ing; while each of the improved schedulers limits the attacker to approximately
its fair share.
5.3.2 Overhead Measurement
To quantify the impact of our scheduler modifications on normal execution (i.e.
in the absence of attacks) we performed a series of measurements to determine
whether application or I/O performance had been degraded by our changes.
Since the primary modifications made were to interrupt-driven accounting logic
in the Xen scheduler, we examined overhead by measuring performance of a
CPU-bound application (unmodified Dhrystone) on Xen while using the differ-
ent scheduler. To reduce variance between measurements (e.g. due to differing
cache line alignment [19]) all schedulers were compiled into the same binary
image, and the desired scheduler selected via a global configuration variable set
at boot or compile time.
Our modifications added overhead in the form of additional interrupts and/or
accounting code to the scheduler, but also eliminated other accounting code
which had performed equivalent functions. To isolate the effect of new code
from that of the removal of existing code, we also measured versions of the
Poisson and Bernoulli schedulers (Poisson-2 and Bernoulli-2 below) which per-
formed all accounting calculations of both schedulers, discarding the output of
the original scheduler calculations.
Results from 100 application runs for each scheduler are shown in Table 5.
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Scheduler CPU overhead (%) 95% CI
Exact 0.50 0.24 – 0.76
Uniform 0.44 0.27 – 0.61
Poisson 0.04 -0.17 – 0.24
Bernoulli -0.10 -0.34 – 0.15
Poisson-2 0.79 0.60 – 0.98
Bernoulli-2 0.79 0.58 – 1.00
Table 5: Scheduler CPU overhead, 100 data points per scheduler.
Overhead of our modified schedulers is seen to be low—well under 1%—and in
the case of the Bernoulli and Poisson schedulers is negligible. Performance of
the Poisson and Bernoulli schedulers was unexpected, as each incurs an addi-
tional 100 interrupts per second; the overhead of these interrupts appears to be
comparable to or less than the accounting code which we were able to remove in
each case. We note that these experiments were performed with Xen running in
paravirtualized mode; the relative cost of accounting code and interrupts may
be different when using hardware virtualization.
We analyzed the new schedulers’ I/O performances by testing the I/O la-
tency between two VMs in two configurations. In configuration 1, two VMs
executed on the same core with no other VMs active, while in configuration 2 a
CPU-bound VM was added on the other core. From the first test, we expected
to see the performance of well-behaved I/O intensive applications on different
schedulers; from the second one, we expected to see that the new schedulers
retain the priority boosting mechanism.
Round-trip delay (µs)
Scheduler (config. 1) (config. 2)
Unmodified Xen Credit 53 ± 0.66 96 ± 1.92
Exact 55 ± 0.61 97 ± 1.53
Uniform 54 ± 0.66 96 ± 1.40
Poisson 53 ± 0.66 96 ± 1.40
Bernoulli 54 ± 0.75 97 ± 1.49
Table 6: I/O latency by scheduler, with 95% confidence intervals.
In Table 6 we see the results of these measurements. Differences in perfor-
mance were minor, and as may be seen by the overlapping confidence intervals,
were not statistically significant.
5.4 Additional Discussion
A comprehensive comparison of our proposed schedulers is shown in Table 7.
The Poisson scheduler seems to be the best option in practice, as it has no
performance overhead nor vulnerability. Even though it has short-period vari-
ance, it guarantees exactly fair share in the long run. The Bernoulli scheduler
would be an alternative if the vulnerability of up to 1ms is not a concern. The
Uniform scheduler has similar performance to the Bernoulli one, and the imple-
mentation of sampling is simpler, but it has more overhead than Poisson and
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Short-run Long-run Low Ease of Determi Theft
Schedulers fairness fairness overhead implementation -nistic -proof
Exact X X X X X
Uniform X X
Poisson X X X
Bernoulli X X
Table 7: Comparison of the new schedulers
Bernoulli. Lastly, the Exact scheduler is the most straight-forward strategy to
prevent cycle stealing, with a relatively trivial implementation but somewhat
higher overhead.
6 Related Work
Tsafrir et al. [25] demonstrate a timing attack on the Linux 2.6 scheduler,
allowing an attacking process to appear to consume no CPU and receive higher
priority. McCanne and Torek [16] present the same cheat attack on 4.4BSD,
and develop a uniform randomized sampling clock to estimate CPU utilization.
They describe sufficient conditions for this estimate to be accurate, but unlike
section 5.2 they do not examine conditions for a theft-of-service attack.
Cherkasova and Gupta et al. [6, 7] have done an extensive performance
analysis of scheduling in the Xen VMM. They studied I/O performance for the
three schedulers: BVT, SEDF and Credit scheduler. Their work showed that
both the CPU scheduling algorithm and the scheduler parameters drastically
impact the I/O performance. Furthermore, they stressed that the I/O model
on Xen remains an issue in resource allocation and accounting among VMs.
Since Domain-0 is indirectly involved in servicing I/O for guest domains, I/O
intensive domains may receive excess CPU resources by focusing on the pro-
cessing resources used by Domain-0 on behalf of I/O bound domains. To tackle
this problem, Gupta et al. [10] introduced the SEDF-DC scheduler, derived
from Xen’s SEDF scheduler, that charges guest domains for the time spent in
Domain-0 on their behalf.
Govindan et al. [11] proposed a CPU scheduling algorithm as an extension
to Xen’s SEDF scheduler that preferentially schedules I/O intensive domains.
The key idea behind their algorithm is to count the number of packages flowing
into or out of each domain and to schedule the one with highest count that has
not yet consumed its entire slice.
However, Ongaro et al. [20] pointed out that this scheme is problematic
when bandwidth-intensive and latency-sensitive domains run concurrently on
the same host - the bandwidth-intensive domains are likely to take priority
over any latency-sensitive domains with little I/O traffic. They explored the
impact of VMM scheduler on I/O performance using multiple guest domains
concurrently running different types of applications and evaluated 11 different
scheduler configurations within Xen VMM with both the SEDF and Credit
schedulers. They also proposed multiple methods to improve I/O performance.
18
Weng et al. [27] found from their analysis that Xen’s asynchronous CPU
scheduling strategy wastes considerable physical CPU time. To fix this prob-
lem, they presented a hybrid scheduling framework that groups VMs into high-
throughput type and concurrent type and determines processing resource allo-
cation among VMs based on type. In a similar vein Kim et al. [14] presented
a task-aware VM scheduling mechanism to improve the performance of I/O-
bound tasks within domains. Their approach employs gray-box techniques to
peer into VMs and identify I/O-bound tasks in mixed workloads.
There are a number of other works on improving other aspects of virtualized
I/O performance [8, 15, 28, 17, 21] and VMM security [23, 18, 12]. To summa-
rize, all of these papers tackle problems of long-term fairness between different
classes of VMs such as CPU-bound, I/O bound, etc.
7 Conclusions
Scheduling has a significant impact on the fair sharing of processing resources
among virtual machines and on enforcing any applicable usage caps per virtual
machine. This is specially important in commercial services like computing
cloud services, where customers who pay for the same grade of service expect
to receive the same access to resources and providers offer pricing models based
on the enforcement of usage caps. However, the Xen hypervisor (and perhaps
others) uses a scheduling mechanism which may fail to detect and account for
CPU usage by poorly-behaved virtual machines, allowing malicious customers to
obtain enhanced service at the expense of others. The use of periodic sampling
to measure CPU usage creates a loophole exploitable by an adroit attacker.
We have demonstrated this vulnerability in Xen 3.2.1 in the lab, and in
Amazon’s Elastic Compute Cloud (EC2) in the field. Under laboratory condi-
tions, we found that the applications exploiting this vulnerability are able to
utilize up to 98% of the CPU core on which they are scheduled, regardless of
competition from other virtual machines with equal priority and share. Amazon
EC2 uses a patched version of Xen, which prevents the capped amount of CPU
resources of other VMs from being stolen. However, our attack scheme can steal
idle CPU cycles to increase its share, and obtain up to 85% of CPU resources
(as mentioned earlier, we have been in discussions with Amazon about the vul-
nerability reported in this paper and our recommendations for fixes; they have
since implemented a fix that we have tested and verified). Finally, we describe
four approaches to eliminating this cycle stealing vulnerability, and demonstrate
their effectiveness at stopping our attack in a laboratory setting. In addition,
we verify that the implemented schedulers offer minor or no overhead.
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A Modified Dhrystone
The main loop in Dhrystone 2.1 is modified by first adding the following con-
stants and global variables. (Note that in practice the CPU speed would be
measured at runtime.)
/* Machine-specific values (for 2.6GHz CPU) */
#define ONE_MS 2600000 /* ticks per 10ms */
#define INTERVAL (ONE_MS * 9) /* 9ms */
#define SLEEP 500 /* 0.5ms (in uS) */
/* TSC counter timestamps */
u_int64_t past, now;
int tmp;
The loop in main() is then modified as follows:
+ int tmp = 0;
for (Run_Index = 1; Run_Index <= Number_Of_Runs; ++Run_Index)
{
+ /* check TSC counter every 10000 loops */
+ if( tmp++ >= 10000) {
+ now = rdtsc();
+ if ( now - past >= INTERVAL ) {
+ /* sleep to bypass sampling tick */
+ usleep(SLEEP);
+ past = rdtsc();
+ tmp = 0;
+ }
+ }
Proc_5();
Proc_4();
...
B Obligations - Legal and Ethical
Since this research essentially involves a theft of service we include a brief discus-
sion (in separate paragraphs) of our legal obligations under statute and ethical
or moral concerns.
Interaction with computer systems in the United States is covered by the
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) which broadly mandates that com-
puter system access must be authorized. As is common with any statute there is
considerable ambiguity in the term “authorization” and the complexity derives
in large part from case precedents and subsequent interpretations [13]. We be-
lieve that we were in full compliance with this statute during the entire course
of this research. We were authorized and paying customers of EC2 and we did
not access any computer systems other than the one we were running on (for
which we were authorized, naturally). All that we did in our virtual machine
was to carefully time our sleeps which, we believe, is completely legal.
Once we realized that it was possible to modify a VM to steal cycles we im-
mediately contacted a few senior executives at Amazon. They, in turn, put us in
touch with members of the team in charge of security for EC2. We gave them a
detailed explanation of the hole we had discovered, along with the code for our
exploit as well as an early draft of this paper. As is well known [22] EC2 does
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not allow its customers to specify the physical hosts on which their instances
are located. We were concerned that in the course of our experiments we could
be stealing cycles not only from EC2 but from other unsuspecting customers of
EC2 as well. We requested the security team to give us access to an isolated
collection of physical hosts on which to conduct our research. Once they verified
our exploit they gave us our own isolated set-up where we were able to see that
our exploit stole unused cycles from EC2 but not from other VMs co-located on
the same host. This means that throughout the entire course of this research
we did not impact other customers. Our exploit could, at the worst, steal cycles
from EC2. The security team then put up a patched version of EC2 on another
separate and isolated set of hosts and we ran a series of tests confirming that
this new version was secure against our exploit. Up to the point of submission of
this article they had not rolled out this new secure version to the EC2 network.
We would like to point out that rather than go public (e.g. to Slashdot or the
popular press) with our findings we first approached Amazon giving them the
opportunity to fix their exploit. We believe that this amply demonstrates our
commitment to fully responsible disclosure and ethical research that enables a
more secure Internet both for users as well as infrastructure providers. In re-
sponse to our findings Amazon rolled out a patch and explicitly acknowledged
our contribution with the following public testimonial “Amazon Web Services
appreciates research efforts that adhere to the guidelines for responsible dis-
closure. The Northeastern team has demonstrated its commitment to Internet
security by working closely with Amazon Web Services prior to publication of
its findings.”
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